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In this paper I raise and respond to the question: Is John Dewey’s un-
derstanding of growth sufficiently responsive to problems associated 
with race and racism? I begin with a discussion of Dewey’s essay “Racial 
Prejudice and Friction,” and show that Dewey lets a major objection to 
his response to racism and prejudice stand without comment. By focus-
ing on this objection I will show that—by Dewey’s own admission—one 
cannot grow morally without confronting aspects of moral psychology 
that Dewey downplayed in offering his response to racism. I will then 
show that James Baldwin’s work offers resources that help us confront 
these aspects of moral psychology, and argue that bringing Dewey in 
conversation with Baldwin allows us to reconstruct our understanding 
of growth so that it becomes more responsive to problems associated 
with race and racism.
In this paper I raise and respond to the question, Is John Dewey’s understanding 
of growth sufficiently responsive to problems associated with race and racism? A 
growing number of scholars have asked similar questions of Dewey’s philosophy.1 
These scholars generally start with an expression of disappointment—how could 
someone so concerned with social issues devote so little attention to the problem 
of racism—and conclude with some variant of the following: While Dewey’s 
philosophy offers us resources that can help as we construct responses to problems 
of race and racism, his philosophy needs to be reconstructed (often by placing it 
in conversation with texts that more explicitly address these problems) in order 
to do so.2 This will, in large part, be the approach I take in this paper. I begin 
with a discussion of Dewey’s essay “Racial Prejudice and Friction,” and show 
that Dewey lets a major objection to his response to racism and prejudice stand 
without comment. By focusing on this objection I will show that—by Dewey’s 
own admission—one cannot grow morally without confronting aspects of moral 
psychology that Dewey downplayed in offering his response to racism. I will 
then show that James Baldwin’s work offers resources that help us confront these 
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aspects of moral psychology, and argue that bringing Dewey in conversation with 
Baldwin allows us to reconstruct our understanding of growth so that it becomes 
more responsive to problems associated with race and racism.
1. John dEwEy’s rEsponsE to racism
Gregory Pappas and Sharon Sullivan offer interpretations of “Racial Prejudice and 
Friction” that are largely consonant, though they draw different conclusions from 
this shared understanding.3 Both Pappas and Sullivan argue that Dewey’s response 
to racism is marked by four central elements: (1) economic and political arrange-
ments must be reconstructed so that (2) proximity of different racial groups will 
lead to communication and community (not the fear, conflict and mutual hostility 
that exists under current arrangements) that will (3) reform and reconstruct habits 
of interaction between individuals from different races so that we might (4) develop 
ethical and educative relations between individuals from different races. As Pap-
pas notes, Dewey’s framework may be insufficient to all of the problems associated 
with race and racism, but it has the virtue of acknowledging the difficulty of these 
problems while also suggesting a flexible yet action-guiding framework that can 
help motivate us to experiment with our current economic and political think-
ing, policies and actions. While Sullivan doesn’t think we should reject Dewey’s 
framework, she thinks it needs to be expanded because Dewey conflates racism 
with ethnocentrism, thereby holding the mistaken view that “all prejudice is borne 
out of unfamiliarity with different groups.”4 More, she argues that,
Nowhere in it [“Racial Prejudice and Friction”], however, does Dewey chal-
lenge, or even indicate awareness of, the white privileged perspective that 
operates within it. He drastically underestimates the obstacles to trans-
formation that one’s unconscious might erect, obstacles that are all the 
more effective because they are not the product of conscious deliberation.5
While I agree with this line of criticism, I don’t think Dewey—as Sullivan asserts—
is unaware of it. As I will show below, he raises this very objection in the essay. 
Yet even though he recognizes the objection, this doesn’t alter his framework. As 
such, I agree with Sullivan that Dewey underestimates the power of racism against 
blacks in America by conflating it with the attitudes that Americans hold towards 
individuals from other cultures, and he similarly underestimates the unconscious 
beliefs that keep many Americans from acknowledging, let alone questioning, their 
own racist beliefs, practices and policies. 
The passage that I turn to as evidence of Dewey’s recognition of Sullivan’s 
main line of criticism comes towards the middle of the essay. After voicing general 
optimism that individuals from historically conflicting groups can find a way to-
wards community and communication, Dewey wonders if white Americans can 
indeed participate in this type of activity: 
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The other consequence concerns the psychological effect of rule upon the 
dominant political group. Arrogance and contempt are fostered. More-
over we also hate those whom we have wronged. There is the feeling, for 
example, that the Negroes must be intrinsically a servile people because 
they allowed themselves to be held in slavery. If they had been equal to 
Anglo-Saxons, the argument usually runs, they would have fought to the 
point of extermination rather than have endured the servile status. . . . 
The disdain and contempt of the overlord class for the inferior is more-
over usually complicated by an uneasy subconscious feeling that perhaps 
the subject people is not really so inferior as its political status indicates. 
Then the expression of superiority assumes a noisy and aggressive form on 
the psychological principle that the “lady protests too much.” An assured 
superiority would be more calmly complacent.6
In this description of the moral psychology of racism, Dewey broadens the types 
of issues that need to be understood if problems of racism are to be adequately ad-
dressed. For example, Dewey notes that the dominant group must work through 
their arrogance and contempt.7 More, the dominant group holds a strong but irra-
tional hatred for the group that it has wronged, and this hatred can be expressive 
of a subconscious feeling that the wronged are really not as inferior as their politi-
cal status indicates. Here Dewey appears to raise Sullivan’s points of criticism, but 
somehow he doesn’t let this line of criticism affect his thinking on how we are to 
work against racism. It may be the case that Dewey underestimates the number of 
individuals who are trapped by the racist moral psychology he accurately diagno-
ses. In his belief in the promise of moral progress, Dewey may not appreciate the 
strength, scope and staying power of racism and its attendant moral psychology. 
While this hope serves its purpose—it can motivate individuals to attempt the work 
of unlearning racism in the face of a more inclusive, democratic aim8—it should 
not keep us from acknowledging the difficulty of the task.9 
In the next section, I develop a moral psychology that maintains Dewey’s 
hope while more fully acknowledging the moral psychology of racism. By expand-
ing Dewey’s diagnosis of racism, and by more fully appreciating the effort it will 
take to overcome it, James Baldwin’s work offers us an opportunity to reconstruct 
what it means to grow as an individual called on to address our own racism and 
the problems of racism in society. 
2. JamEs baldwin on racE and racism
Although Baldwin is primarily recognized as a writer of fiction and essays, a grow-
ing number of philosophers and political theorists are beginning to take his work 
seriously on questions and issues of race and racism.10 The interest in Baldwin shown 
by these commentators has, for the moment, not carried over into conversations 
in the philosophy of education.11 This is unfortunate, as I hope to illustrate below, 
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because Baldwin offers a compelling account of racism that stands as an important 
and significant corrective to Dewey’s insufficiently critical vision of how racism is 
to be addressed. At the center of Baldwin’s account is his diagnosis of the myth of 
white innocence. While innocence is often contrasted with guilt, Baldwin’ aim is 
not (as it were) to burden his readers with a guilty conscience. Instead, Baldwin 
challenges us to do the far more difficult thing: to work from innocence and to a 
place where growth and maturity are possible. Guilt is not a requirement for this 
type of growth and maturity, but growth and maturity—as I will show in more 
detail below—is impossible if white Americans continue to evade the reality of rac-
ism and its continuing significance.12
2.1. The Myth of White Innocence
White innocence is a topic Baldwin addresses across his writing career, and it is 
not easily captured in a definitive statement. Instead, white innocence is a nest 
of conscious and unconscious beliefs and feelings that are expressed in overtly 
and covertly racist language, actions and policies. At its core, though, stands a 
pernicious belief that there is a causal relationship between prosperity—wealth, 
power, social standing—and moral goodness. That is, white innocence revolves 
around the belief that individuals with power deserve it because they are morally 
good, and anyone without power is also, therefore, morally bad. Following this 
logic, because white Americans hold the most power in the world they are also 
the most moral people in the world. Baldwin is not, importantly, only interested 
in exposing the hypocrisy of this type of view. Showing that prosperity is often 
built and sustained by immoral acts—slavery, colonialism, violence—is far too 
obvious, to Baldwin, to merit sustained comment. What interests Baldwin are 
the effects of taking an idea like this seriously: the life one leads if this is—even 
if unconsciously—one’s guiding moral ideal. In an early essay, “Stranger in the 
Village,” Baldwin writes,
Most people are not naturally reflective any more than they are naturally 
malicious, and the white man prefers to keep the black man at a certain 
human remove because it is easier for him thus to preserve his simplic-
ity and avoid being called to account for crimes committed by his forefa-
thers, or his neighbors. He is inescapably aware, nevertheless, that he is 
in a better position in the world than black men are, nor can he quite put 
to death a suspicion that he is hated by black men therefore. He does not 
wish to be hated, neither does he wish to change places, and at this point 
in his uneasiness he can scarcely avoid having recourse to those legends 
which white men have created about black men, the most usual effect of 
which is that the white man finds himself enmeshed, so to speak, in his 
own language which describes hell, as well as the attributes which lead one 
to hell, as being black as night.13
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In this passage Baldwin illustrates the complexity and difficulty of holding onto 
white innocence in the face of overwhelming evidence to its contrary. The white 
man knows that he wouldn’t want to change places with the black man, and he fears 
that his position in society may have been established, not by the moral strength 
and virtuous acts of his forefathers, but by dint of crime. Not wanting to deal di-
rectly with that fear, to work through the myths of white innocence, he invents a 
contrasting myth (the violent, the sexual, the dangerous black man)14 that allows 
him to return to his simplicity, purity and innocence. Sadly, as Baldwin makes us 
painfully aware, the myths that the white world creates about the black world keep 
those who subscribe to those myths enmeshed in stories, feelings and beliefs that 
distort and hide reality. White innocence, then, gives rise to feelings of purity and 
simplicity that keep those under its influence from the truth.15
2.1.2. Purity and Simplicity
Importantly, what is salient about white innocence is not its almost immediately 
apparent hypocrisy. Rather, what is significant is what it creates. The individual 
under its influence knows—but cannot acknowledge16—that something is terri-
bly amiss. Again, instead of working towards what is really at issue, the individual 
retreats into myths. Because these myths are even harder to sustain than that 
which gave rise to them, the individual is forced to (as it were) dig in: to become 
entrenched; to close off; to become embattled. As Baldwin writes, “No one is more 
dangerous than he who imagines himself pure in heart: for his purity, by defini-
tion, is unassailable.”17 Pointing out the flaws of someone who believes that she is 
pure of heart—even using her own definitions of what counts as being flawed—is 
not productive, according to Baldwin, because that person is not interested in what 
is the case. She is interested in producing, reproducing, protecting and promoting 
her flawed vision of reality. Someone like this is dangerous because he or she has 
given up on the difficult pursuit of truth and justice under the false assumption 
that she is already there. Baldwin makes a related point:
Americans, unhappily, have the most remarkable ability to alchemize 
all bitter truths into an innocuous but piquant confection and to trans-
form their moral contradictions, or public discussions of such contradic-
tions, into a proud decoration, such as are given for heroism on the field 
of battle.18
Instead of engaging what is actually at issue—a certain uneasiness about one’s own 
privilege, a certain uneasiness about one’s race, a certain uneasiness about how 
race, privilege and morality interact—we deflect our uneasiness,19 transforming it 
into something that we can get behind; something that we can fight for; something 
that makes us feel like an approximation of a hero on a field of battle. We avoid, 
or evade, the difficult source of our confusion and uncertainty about the interre-
lations between race, privilege and morals, and engage in what often amounts to 
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a high-minded condemnation of an entire race of people. But, as Baldwin so as-
tutely diagnoses,
In overlooking, denying, evading his [a black American’s] complexity—
which is nothing more than the disquieting complexity of ourselves—we 
are diminished and we perish; only within this web of ambiguity, paradox, 
this hunger, danger, darkness, can we find at once ourselves and the power 
that will free us from ourselves.20
Although we may feel a momentary rush of virtue in condemning our falsified 
view of the other, and although we can fight valiantly to preserve our sense of 
high-mindedness, this way of living dooms us to delusions that we cannot extri-
cate ourselves from. So caught, we can never experience moral maturity and moral 
growth. In order to grow, we must make the difficult return to reality: letting loose 
of the myth of white innocence, and facing up to the ambiguity, paradox, danger, 
and darkness of moral life. 
2.1.3. Returning to Reality
Baldwin works to get his reader to a point where he or she feels compelled to choose 
between the myths that sustain a false sense of virtue and a confrontation with the 
difficulty of reality. One strategy he uses is exhortation. Thus, in The Fire Next Time, 
he wants his reader to see that the myths we cling to have the potential to destroy 
us. For example, if the Black Muslim [Nation of Islam] continues to believe that the 
white man is the devil, and the white world continues to believe that the living con-
ditions in some predominately black neighborhoods—like Baldwin’s Harlem—can 
be chalked up to lack of virtue on the part of its black inhabitants, then violence and 
strife lie in wait. But, he tells us, we can get out from under these myths: “We are 
capable of bearing a great burden, once we discover that the burden is reality and 
arrive where reality is.”21 This process will not be easy, and it will cause those who 
succumb to a belief in—for example—the inherent superiority or inferiority of an 
entire race of people, a great deal of confusion and anxiety. Nonetheless, we must 
confront reality. Moving from the extortive to the descriptive, Baldwin suggests, 
in some passages, that we have no other choice but to confront reality, despite our 
best evasive efforts. In “The Black Boy Looks at the White Boy,” Baldwin writes,
This is not the way this truth presents itself to white men, who believe the 
world is theirs and who, albeit unconsciously, expect the world to help them 
in the achievement of their identity. But the world does not do this—for 
anyone; the world is not interested in anyone’s identity. And, therefore, 
the anguish which can overtake a white man comes in the middle of his 
life, when he must make the almost inconceivable effort to divest himself 
of everything he has ever expected or believed, when he must take himself 
apart and put himself together again, walking out of the world, into limbo, 
or into what certainly looks like limbo.22
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Building on this passage, the middle-aged white man who has always experienced 
prosperity has also—even if only unconsciously—assumed that he was virtuous. 
But—as Baldwin has already shown—the direct causal link between virtue and 
prosperity is suspect, and an unknowing subscription to this belief can cause a 
great deal of unease when the belief is called into question. When the middle-aged 
man can no longer claim virtue with absolute certainty, when he realizes that his 
identity is his to be found, made, and earned, then it can feel as if he is entering a 
kind of limbo. He may wish to return to the myths that sustained his virtue, but he 
cannot: he has found reality, and it is his to live the acknowledgement of that reality. 
2.2. Growth
When we realize that the myths that sustained us for so long are no longer sus-
tainable, we are left in the state of limbo that Baldwin describes above. Baldwin 
describes his own experience of limbo in The Fire Next Time. Looking for some-
thing that would make sense of his life for him, Baldwin entered the church as a 
child preacher. Though this life gave him a certain prestige in his neighborhood 
and a certain power over his father, he realized that the enterprise was—for him—a 
sham. The pulpit kept him from a confrontation with his own life and what matters 
to him. Instead of facing his sexuality, his race, his country, his father, he embraced 
the church. After freeing himself from the church, he reclaimed responsibility for 
finding his own way in the world. His description of Elijah Mohammed and his 
followers in The Fire Next Time is a striking reminder that—though he agreed with 
many of the things Mohammed says—Baldwin would not abdicate responsibility 
for his own growth to anyone. He writes,
It is the responsibility of free men to trust and to celebrate what is con-
stant—birth, struggle, and death are constant, and so is love, though we 
may not always think so—and to apprehend the nature of change, to be 
able and willing to change.23
We must be willing to change, because the things that matter in life—birth, strug-
gle, death, love—are dynamic, and they call on us to be responsive to change and 
changes, and so they call us to change. While talk of love and birth and struggle 
may strike readers as somehow out of line in serious discussions about the moral 
life,24 Baldwin wants his readers to refocus on the importance of love in our life as 
a way of turning us towards an acceptance of responsibility for growth:
I use the word “love” here not merely in the personal sense but as a state 
of being, or a state of grace—not in the infantile American sense of be-
ing made happy but in the tough and universal sense of quest and daring 
and growth.25
Love is not purity or innocence, and it is not the given birthright of the prosper-
ous or the downtrodden. Instead, love is a type of growth: a process that calls on 
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us to turn away from sustaining—but ultimately destructive—myths, undergoing 
what can feel like limbo, so that we can face up to what we know to be problems 
in our life and in our life with others. One of the major problems that Americans 
face is the continuing significance of racism and racist policies.26 While we can 
pretend that this is not the case, we know that doing so would be evasive. We must 
work through our racism and the racism of our society, and we must try to grow 
through—not around, or in willful ignorance of—all of the difficult thoughts, emo-
tions, and tensions that this work will invariably evoke. Hoping that good policy 
or good intentions will substitute for this struggle towards growth gets us in the 
state we remain in, almost one hundred years after Dewey’s “Racial Prejudice and 
Friction”: uneasy with our feelings about race, uneasy with how race is talked about 
in public and private, uneasy teaching students of different races, uneasy in daily 
interactions across racial lines.27
3. conclusions
John Dewey clearly knows that the fact of growth and change is as much an intel-
lectual as it is a social and moral issue. What I hope to have shown in section one 
of this paper is that Dewey did not fully appreciate the moral psychology of racism. 
While Dewey acknowledges that racism influences aspects of our moral psychol-
ogy—it can breed arrogance, contempt, and provoke a noisy aggressiveness—he 
doesn’t use this acknowledgement as a means to reconstructing his own thinking 
on racism. Because of this, Dewey underestimates its difficulty. His solution to the 
problems of racism—the implementation of redistributive economic policies and 
increased social contact between the races—seem doomed to failure if society is 
caught in the grip of the myth of white innocence. If this is the case—if Baldwin’s 
diagnosis of American society is accurate—then we might begin to wonder just 
how significant Dewey’s failure to account for the tenacious hold of racism may be. 
If racist moral psychology can effectively marshal myth to silence many of the facts 
it is presented with; if racist moral psychology can create ways of avoiding self-crit-
icism and self-reflection; if racist moral psychology can shut off learning from the 
non-white contacts of life, we might worry: Can Dewey’s educational project get off 
the ground under these conditions? I can’t answer this question definitively, but if 
my reading of Baldwin’s significance is compelling, educators should be concerned 
that if the moral psychology of racism is not adequately addressed, our best hopes 
for a reconstructed democracy will remain unrealized. Yet, if we learn from Bald-
win’s writing, we can reconstruct what growth means, and we can—in turn—see 
new ways of renewing Dewey’s educational project. With a better understanding 
of the moral psychology of racism, we can appreciate how challenging it will be to 
create environments and opportunities that cause individuals to trade the delusion 
of innocence for the possibility of growth.
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